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Abstract
The success of intelligent agents in clinical care depends on the degree
to which they represent and work with human decision makers. This is
particularly important in the domain of clinical risk assessment where such
agents either conduct the task of risk evaluation or support human clini-
cians with the task. This paper provides insights into how to understand
and capture the cognitive processes used by clinicians when collecting the
most important data about a person’s risks. It attempts to create some
theoretical foundations for developing clinically justifiable and reliable de-
cision support systems for initial risk screening. The idea is to direct an
assessor to the most informative next question depending on what has
already been asked using a mixture of probabilities and heuristics. The
method was tested on anonymous mental health data collected by the
GRiST risk and safety tool (www.egrist.org).
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1 Introduction
Successful intelligent agents are those which can learn and utilise human exper-
tise. This is of particular importance in the health-care sector where comput-
erised systems aim to facilitate important clinical tasks including risk assess-
ment [1, 2]. For mental health, evaluating risks such as suicide and self-harm
is particularly challenging, because the symptoms, motives and deterrents are
often abstract and difficult to measure. Here, intelligent agents such as certain
types of Clinical Decision Support Systems (CDSSs) can play an important role
by guiding users towards the most informative data features and advising on
the risks associated with the collected data. If they are to be used in real-world
settings, it is crucial that these computer agents are completely reliable.
Although recent reviews on the impact of CDSSs on the quality of healthcare
have suggested an overall improvement [3, 4], difficulties remain with modelling
and prediction of risk [5, 6]. The underlying problem is that many CDSSs cannot
∗Corresponding Author: Ali Rezaei-Yazdi, Aston University, Aston Triangle, Birmingham,
B4 7ET; E-mail: rezaeiya@aston.ac.uk.
1
reliably represent the clinicians’ mental model of how the system should work [7,
8] i.e. accommodating clinicians’ cognitive work flow [9]. Many intelligent agents
lack a functional model allowing meaningful interpretation of results in terms
of the features used for their risk classifications [10]. All these factors result in
a reluctance to use such systems for major decision making tasks such as risk
judgements because clinicians trust their own expertise and experience more
than the complex models that underpin the intelligent systems [6, 11].
To gain the trust of clinicians, CDSSs must support their cognitive work flow
and mental models of decision-making [8, 12]. This requires knowledge of how
clinicians think and collect data, and how the data they collect work together
to determine judgements of patients’ health.
The goal of this research is to understand how clinicians are alerted to the most
pertinent information for evaluating risks. Their data-collection processes can
then be simulated by intelligent agents so that they point assessors to the right
data at the right time for making quick and effective clinical decisions.
The research analyses a database of patient profiles associated with clinical
risk judgements in order to understand how the relationships within the data
influence those judgements. It does not aim to introduce a new model or algo-
rithm, but rather focuses on the theoretical investigations necessary for building
a clinically justifiable model to be used for clinical intelligent agents. The pa-
per will provide the study context and then explain the methodology in detail.
The results will be described and discussed followed by conclusions and future
work.
2 Context
The research was conducted on data collected by the Galatean Risk & Safety
Tool, GRiST,[13] which is a clinical decision support system that helps assessors
evaluate risks of suicide, self-harm, harm to others, self-neglect, and vulnera-
bility. This study focused on suicide and used 30,000 cases of completed risk
assessments provided by mental-health practitioners through their normal prac-
tice. The data are automatically stored without personal identification informa-
tion before any researcher has access to them and so are completely anonymous
from the start.1.
GRiST is based on a psychological model of classification for representing clin-
ical expertise [14]. The risk nodes such as suicide are hierarchical ‘trees’ that
are deconstructed into progressively more granular concepts (branches) such
as ‘Current Intention’ and ‘Feelings & Emotions’ until leaves of the tree are
reached, such as anger and anxiety. Figure 1 shows a simplified part of the
suicide risk tree.
Although GRiST has several hundred leaf nodes, and therefore a very large
potential data set for each patient, the actual number of questions is much
lower because the tree provides a top-down gateway to the relevant concepts.
1Ethics approval was obtained from NRES Committee East Midlands, 13/EM/0007, and
Aston University.
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Figure 1: Part of the suicide risk knowledge tree.
For example, a top-level question is whether the patient has any history of
suicide attempts and if the answer is ‘NO’ then all the history questions remain
hidden and unasked. Hence the knowledge hierarchy imposes constraints on the
order of asking questions because the branch questions have to be asked before
the leaf questions are reached. When assessors have finished asking questions,
they are asked to provide their overall risk judgement for the patient in the form
of a score ranging from 0 (no risk) to 10 (maximum risk).
The idea is that not all the branches of the tree or all the questions of a branch
are necessarily relevant for the patient under assessment. The task is to under-
stand which branch variables (i.e. answers to branch questions) influence risk
judgement, to what degree, and how these influences impact on the process of
data collection. Data collection can then be guided only to those parts of the
knowledge tree that are required for the particular risk assessment and particular
patient under assessment, thereby minimising the number of questions needing
to be asked. The specific objectives are to understand what drives the data col-
lection behaviour of clinicians and use this to find a minimum set of variables
required to provide accurate risk judgements for any particular patient.
3 Methodology
Bayes Theorem describes how the degree of belief in an event should change to
account for evidence and is widely utilised for analysing clinical decision mak-
ing [16, 17]. In this study, it was applied to understand how clinical judgements
are affected by the sequence of data collection. The aim was to determine which
questions would change the judgement the most, in the light of data already
collected. Guiding assessors to these questions would provide the least number
of questions required to provide the most informative risk evaluation.
The method is not as simple as described so far because each branch can have
two answers, YES or NO, and they will not have the same influence on the
posterior probability: the ‘YES’ answer may cause a large change with the
‘NO’ answer having no effect at all. Hence a question may only be useful for
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one answer but not the other and the likelihood of each answer affects the
overall informativeness of the question. Furthermore, the informativeness of an
answer changes depending on what has already been asked and the conditional
probabilities have to be updated for each new answer.
The conditional probability of an event ‘A’ given another event ‘B’ is denoted
in this paper using the following format:
P (A|B) reads as probability of A given B.
The condition (in the above example, B) is taken as the Independent Variable,
the IV, and the event whose probability we are trying to calculate (in the above
example, A) is called the Dependent Variable, the DV. Using this approach,
the investigation was carried out in 2 main stages.
1. Stage 1: To investigate how answers to the questions of the knowledge tree
influence clinicians’ final risk judgement. First, we looked at how each vari-
able changed the suicide risk judgement on its own, to give a measure of its
predictive power. Second, we explored how variables change the probability
of risk in combination with other variables, to find combinations of variables
that are particularly predictive compared to each one separately.
2. Stage 2: To investigate whether clinicians’ decide that it is not worth pur-
suing a line of reasoning. If clinicians stop asking questions in one part of
the tree because of the answers they have obtained elsewhere, it should be
possible to detect redundant parts of the tree. Assessors can then be guided
away from these and towards more useful lines of questioning with respect
to risk evaluation.
4 Findings
The risk judgements were categorised into three groups: High Risk (risk scores
of 7 and above), Medium Risk (risk scores 4,5,6) and Low Risk (risk scores
of 3 and below). These groupings made it easier to measure the degree of
dependency between variables and the risk by treating each risk group as a
separate variable. Since determining the high risk patients is most important,
the investigation concentrated on measuring the variables influence on High
Risk. What follows is the result of analyses and the semantic conclusions drawn
from them.
4.1 Stage 1: Influence of variables and their combinations
on risk judgements)
With a total of 28 branch and sub-branch variables, 28 pairs of conditional prob-
abilities of the risk given a question’s answers were produced because only the
“yes” answers were analysed (the “no” answers are, by definition, not indicative
of high risk). Then the answers for each question were paired with answers for
the other variables in combinations of pairs and triples. Any more than three
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variables reducee the sample size significantly and also became unmanageable in
scale: 28 variables combined in groups of two produces 378 combinations and in
groups of three produces 3,276 combinations based on combination factorial cal-
culations. Each combination was then compared against the high risk variable
to give a total number of 3,654 conditional probability calculations.
The combinations producing the most influence on high risk were selected, with a
sample shown in Table 1. The table shows variables’ influence on the probability
of High Risk on an individual basis as well as jointly. The CP column gives the
conditional probability of the DV given the IV and the change in the probability
of DV caused by the IV is the fourth ∆P column. The change in probability, ∆P ,
shows how influential the variable is on the clinicians’ risk judgements.
Independent Variable Dependant Variable CP ∆P
Current Intention High Risk 0.37 0.32
Presentation High Risk 0.22 0.17
Suicide Triggers High Risk 0.14 0.09
Ideation High Risk 0.13 0.08
Self-Worth High Risk 0.12 0.07
Motive&Engagement High Risk 0.11 0.06
Feeling&Emotion High Risk 0.09 0.04
Personality High Risk 0.09 0.04
Presentation &
High Risk 0.51 0.48
Current Intention
Current Intention &
High Risk 0.46 0.41
Suicide Planning
Presentation &
High Risk 0.32 0.28
Self-Worth
Presentation &
High Risk 0.30 0.25
Verbal Indicators
Presentation &
High Risk 0.22 0.17
Personality
Suicide ideation &
High Risk 0.20 0.14
Personality
Table 1: A selection of most influential variables which individually or in com-
bination influence clinicians’ judgement of risk.
Figure 2 and 3 visualise the result of Table 1. Figure 2 shows the variables
with strongest predictive power (influence) on the probability of High Risk on
individual basis. Figure 3, on the other hand, shows the variable combinations
with strongest predictive power on High Risk.
Table 1 and the associated figures reveal important insights into the clinicians’
pattern of response. Some variables often appear in combinations with high
predictive power as well as being strong independent predictors. It would make
sense if these were primary drivers of clinical decisions and they include Cur-
rent Intention to commit suicide (CI), Suicide Triggers (ST), Suicide Ideation
(SI), Presentation of patients during assessment (PR), Self-Worth (SW) and
Motivation & Engagement (M&E).
Furthermore, some variables’ show increased predictive power in combination
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Figure 2: Variables with strongest probability impact on High Risk on individual
basis.
with other variables. For example, Self-Worth (SW), on its own, changes the
probability of High Risk (HR) by 0.07 but when combined with the variable





= 0.07 6= ∆P
((
HR|PR)∣∣SW) = 0.10
=⇒ SW demonstrates interactive behaviour with PR.
This means that when clinicians are concerned with the ‘Presentation’ of pa-
tients, asking about Self-Worth would increase clinicians’ chance of judging the
patients as high risk, if self worth was, indeed, an issue. To guide assessors
to the most important data, the system needs to know both the independent
influence of a variable and also how much it is likely to change the impact of
risk in conjunction with others already asked.. Interaction of variable influences
is the key because the addition of a second or third IV sometimes influences
the probability of high risk sometimes does not. For example, according to Ta-
ble 1, Presentation, on its own changes the probability of High Risk by 0.17 but
if the variable Personality (PER) is added, the risk is hardly affected (this is
demonstrated in Figure 3 by having the column representing Presentation and
Personality as completely blue). However, when Personality is added to Sui-
cide Ideation, the probability of High Risk increases by 0.07. It shows how the
strength of interactions dynamically changes as new answers are added.
The results so far suggest that there are a limited number of features which
strongly influence the clinical risk judgement. Furthermore, although the influ-
ences on risk change as new answers are added to previous ones, if the previous
answers are already strong influencers, new answers make little difference: the
strong influencers are making others redundant, which is an important factor in
determining the order of data collection if minimising the questions required is
important (which is the case for screening tools). This is investigated in more
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Figure 3: Combination of variables with strongest probability impact on High
Risk. Different proportion of colouring demonstrates the power of each vari-
able in the combinations. For example the first column shows the combination
of Current Intention and Presentation with Current Intention having a more
impact on risk, hence the column is dominated in red.
detail in Stage 2.
4.2 Stage 2: identifying redundant data
Having identified the most influential variables, it is important to clarify whether
they mask all the other variables or whether there are certain combinations that
will still be informative. It may also be the case that a particular variable is
redundant for a certain sequence of answers but later becomes influential if a
new one is added.
Redundancy was investigated using Conditional Independence between IVs and
the DV: is the DV (high risk) independent of an IV when that IV occurs in
conjunction with another IV? If so, then only the second IV is required. This
can be written in terms of conditional probabilities as:
P (DV |IV 2 ∩ IV 1) = P (DV |IV 2)
where IV2 is the independent variable that is fully incorporating the influence
of IV1. A variable can only be considered redundant if none of its answers (YES
or NO) can change the probability of the risk, given any answer (YES or NO)
to the other variables. Therefore, the first redundancy test checks to see what
effects the different answers for an IV would have on the redundancy of the
other, test IV (T-IV).
The second redundancy test examines the effects of different answers to the
T-IV on redundancy of itself in relation to the risk. In other words, it checks to
see how different answers to T-IV change its level of influence on the risk given
that the first IV is present.
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Redundancy Test 1:




IF P (HR | IV=NO & T-IV) ≈ P (HR | IV=NO)
Redundancy Test 2:




IF P (HR | IV & T-IV=NO) ≈ P (HR | IV)
The third test complements the previous two by checking to see if a variable
which has been made (by the first two tests) redundant remains redundant
permanently or whether it can become informative at a later point during the
assessment when further variables have been collected.
Redundancy Test 3:
Given T-IV is redundant against IV




P (HR | IV1 & additional IVs)
The idea is that if the redundant features stay redundant throughout the assess-
ment, then they can be removed from the sequence of questions. The method
was tested using a selection of the strongest variables as found in Table 1 along
with some of the weaker variables, with a variable deemed redundant if and only
if it passes all the three redundancy tests.
The results were interesting: Some variables pass none of the tests, some pass
the first test but not the second and some pass the first and second but not
the third. For example, Tables 2, 3 and 4 show the result of the 3 redundancy
tests on Current Intention, Presentation, Feeling&Emotion and Mental Faculty.
In these tests, Current Intention is taken as the IV and the other three are
taken as the T-IVs. The tables show that Presentation is redundant if and
only if Current Intention is given a NO value. Otherwise Presentation can
independently change the level of risk. Presentation thus fails the first test of
redundancy as demonstrated in Table 2 and is not investigated further. On
the other hand, Feeling&Emotion passes the first test of redundancy, which
gives the impression that as long as Current Intention is collected (whether
its value is YES or NO) Feeling&Emotion is redundant. However it fails the
second test (as demonstrated in Table 3) meaning Feeling&Emotion does not
necessarily stay redundant if it has a NO value. In other words, while a YES
value to Feeling&Emotion makes it redundant in the presence of either Current
Intention answer, a NO value will actually make Feeling&Emotion informative
(i.e. independently causes a substantial change on the probability of risk).
In contrast to Feeling&Emotion, Mental Faculty passes the first two tests. This
means if Current Intention is collected (regardless of the value it takes), then
Mental Faculty will always be redundant regardless of the value it is given
(demonstrated by Tables 2 and 3). This might suggest that Mental Faculty is
completely redundant but surprisingly Mental Faculty does not pass the third
8
Redundancy Test 1 Threshold
IV = Current Intention CI , T-IV = Presentation PR ∆P >0.05
P(High Risk | CI = Yes & PR = YES)
= 0.51
6= P(High Risk | CI = Yes)
= 0.37
0.14 Over
P(High Risk | CI = NO & PR = YES)
= 0.04




IV = Current Intention CI , T-IV = Feeling&Emotion FE ∆P >0.05
P(High Risk | CI = Yes & FE = YES)
= 0.39
≈ P(High Risk | CI = Yes)
= 0.37
0.02 Within
P(High Risk | CI = NO & FE = YES)
= 0.02




IV = Current Intention CI , T-IV = Mental Faculty MF ∆P >0.05
P(High Risk | CI = Yes &MF=YES)
= 0.40
≈ P(High Risk | CI = Yes)
= 0.37
0.03 Within
P(High Risk | CI = NO & MF =
YES) = 0.01
≈ P(High Risk | CI = NO)
= 0.01
0.0 Within
Table 2: First redundancy test applied to Presentation, Feeling&Emotion and
Mental Faculty against Current Intention. Feeling&Emotion and Mental Fac-
ulty pass the test. Presentation fails the test as the change it causes on High
Risk is over the threshold
Redundancy Test 2 Threshold
IV = Current Intention CI , T-IV = Feeling&Emotion FE ∆P >0.05
P(High Risk | CI = Yes & FE = Yes)
= 0.39
≈ P(High Risk | CI = Yes)
= 0.37
0.02 Within
P(High Risk | CI = Yes & FE = No)
= 0.26




IV = Current Intention CI , T-IV = Mental Faculty MF ∆P >0.05
P(High Risk | CI = Yes & MF = Yes)
= 0.40
≈ P(High Risk | CI = Yes)
= 0.37
0.03 Within
P(High Risk | CI = Yes & MF = No)
= 0.37
= P(High Risk | CI = Yes)
= 0.37
0.0 Within
Table 3: Second redundancy test applied to Feeling&Emotion and Mental Fac-
ulty against Current Intention. Mental Faculty passes the test. Feeling&Emo-
tion fails as the change it cases on High Risk is over the threshold when it is
given a ‘NO’ answer
Redundancy Test 3 Threshold
IV = Current Intention CI , T-IV = Mental Faculty MF ∆P >0.05
Additional Variable = Feeling&Emotion FE
P(High Risk | CI = Yes & MF = Yes)
= 0.40
≈ P(High Risk | CI = Yes)
= 0.37
0.03 Within
P(High Risk | CI = Yes & FE= Yes P(High Risk | CI = Yes 0.07 Over
& MF = Yes) = 0.46 6= & FE= Yes) = 0.39
Table 4: Third redundancy test applied to Mental Faculty against Current
Intention. Mental Faculty fails the test as it regains its informativeness after
being made redundant once.
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test. Table 4 shows that Mental Faculty which was previously made redundant
with Current Intention, becomes informative (∆P >Threshold) when a second
IV (i.e. Feeling&Emotion) is added to Current Intention. In other words, Mental
Faculty comes back to be informative when Feeling&Emotion has been given
a YES value. In clinical terms this means that when clinicians collect Current
Intention and are also concerned with Feeling&Emotion, then the questions on
Mental Faculty would influence their judgement of risk but not if they are not
concerned with Feeling&Emotion.
These findings point out an important concept: the pattern of variable redun-
dancy is not fixed but evolves throughout the assessment. In other words,
a variables redundancy (and informativeness) is a dynamic phenomenon and
changes as the value to other variables become available.
4.3 Clinical conclusions from the result
This investigation provides preliminary suggestions about how clinical assess-
ments might be optimised:
1. There are a group of features that are always influence the clinical judgements
and these are absolutely required in all contexts.
2. Depending on the context, which is dictated by the data collected during the
course of the assessment, less influential features can actually be informative
and hence required for evaluating the level of risk.
3. Clinicians do not evaluate the predictiveness of a variable in isolation from
other variables. Rather, they base their evaluation on the combination of
answers already obtained. Hence a new answer that is informative on its
own can be completely redundant in the presence of other data because
clinicians feel that the new information adds little or nothing to their existing
understanding of the level of risk.
4. The informativeness of data fluctuates throughout an assessment. Not only
does a variable’s predictive power depend on the preceding variables but it
can also change depending on the future data too. This dynamic life line is
illustrated by Figure 4.
Figure 4: Data informativeness life line
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5. The dynamic nature of data redundancy means the optimal order of asking
questions is also dynamic: it has to be decided in real time.
5 Conclusion & Future work
In order for clinical decision support systems CDSSs to be effective, they have to
be intelligent agents that simulate the clinical judgements of a human clinician.
To achieve this, such intelligent agents have to be able to replicate clinicians’ ex-
pertise and way of reasoning. This research has explored this aim by analysing a
database of mental health risk assessments. The research aimed to understand
the factors and circumstances influencing humans (i.e. clinicians) decisions on
the data they need to collect. Specifically, it tried to find out whether there
is an optimal order of answers that produce the most accurate risk judgements
with the least number of questions. This was pursued by analysing the proba-
bilistic relationships between variables and clinical risk judgements at multiple
levels.
The findings were used to extract key lessons about the way clinicians’ risk
judgements respond to the sequence of data collected. The most important
is that the informativeness of variables have different patterns during the as-
sessment. Some become redundant in the light of previous answers and will
never then become informative; others are always informative; and some may
be redundant with certain sequences of answers but then become informative
in the light of a new answer, which means that their initial redundancy has not
consigned them to the dustbin as far as asking the question. There is no fixed
order of questions that will be the optimal one for all patients.
The challenge is to use this extracted clinical intelligence to produce an in-
telligent decision support agent that is able to communicate with the human
risk assessors, take input from them and then find and collect the best set of
data features for each different patient and context. The model will then use
the collected data and the induced knowledge to provide intelligent advice for
the human assessors. Exactly how to do this is currently under investigation.
One of the most significant outcomes will be a system that can provide screen-
ing questions and accompanying risk advice for people without a mental-health
background, based on the inherent expertise of the clinical judgements residing
in the GRiST database. It will be particularly useful for primary care and emer-
gency services who have to make fast and reliable mental-health triage decisions
for people in the community.
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